

Reflections on S. Freud's "The Future of an Illusion" (1927).

Werner Köpp, Berlin

The Future of an Illusion is generally considered to be Freud's main work on religion. It is safe to assume that Freud was familiar with the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach's treatise on "The Essence of Christianity" (1841). Drawing on Feuerbach's projection theory Freud describes and analyses the individual and societal function of religion, which he characterises in the *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* as "religious world-view"¹ (Freud 1932, p. 16ff.). Freud believes that the truth content of religion is insignificant. In the above lectures he concludes: "*Religion is an attempt to master the sensory world in which we are situated by means of the wishful world which we have developed within us as a result of biological and psychological necessities.*" (p. 168).

The Future of an Illusion (1927) is counted among Freud's writings in which he takes a critical stance on civilisation and society. These also include: *Totem and Taboo* (1912), *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), *Why War?* (1933), *Moses and Monotheism* (1939).

In the nineteen-thirties Freud, under the influence of his illness and against the background of the steep rise of National Socialism, shifted the focus of his research onto the cultural aspects of mankind. In 1933 he wrote to Einstein:

¹ This word might be translated 'A View of the Universe' according to the Standard Edition.

„For incalculable ages mankind has been passing through a process of evolution of culture. (Some people, I know, prefer to use the term ‘civilization’.) We owe to that process the best of what we have become, as well as a good part of what we suffer from.” (Freud 1933, p. 214).

In the same letter Freud points to the increasing influence of the intellect over the drives. According to Freud, this has led to an *„internalization of the aggressive impulses, with all its consequent advantages and perils.”* (p. 214-215). In the second half of his life Freud intensified his research into these dangerous consequences and analysed their impact on the societal level.

What is Freud’s psychodynamic understanding of religion?

Freud views religion as an expression of an infantile fixation which is dragged along into adult life by the individual in particular and mankind in general. On the other hand, Freud also believes that religion is embedded in the civilisational context from which it originated. He therefore analyses the relationship between the individual and the given civilisational framework with all its dictates and institutions. According to Freud, religion classifies as a “dictate” which is tied to ethical demands he views as indispensable; religious faith, on the other hand, may be potentially dangerous (Freud 1932, S. 181)². In terms of human evolution he sees religion as merely being some kind of collective neurosis. However, regarding religion as nothing more than

² With reference to Lecky’s History and European Morals (1869) Beres (1965) differentiated between ethics and morals. He defined morals as the “response of the individual to the ethical demands of his time”.

an illusion is one of Freud's key rationales. Moreover, he does not analyse the counter-concept to actual reality which is unconsciously inherent in religion.

In a passionate public counter-argument entitled "The Illusion of a Future: A Friendly Disagreement with Prof. Sigmund Freud", clergyman and psychoanalyst Oskar Pfister, a good friend of Freud's, advocated the notion that true faith protects from neurosis. Pfister argues that religion is by no means a neurotic symptom per se, but tends to be distorted by any neurosis that may have developed in its own right. At Freud's express request, Pfister's essay was published in the *Imago* magazine in the year 1928 (see also Henning, Murken and Nestler 2003, p. 33). In expressing these views Pfister had set a course towards the understanding of religion as postulated by C. G. Jung. According to Jung, religious experiences are first and foremost the results of inner workings of the mind. On the other hand, Jung believes that they are already rooted in the so-called collective unconscious in the form of the *Imago Dei*, and may surface to the conscious mind in the wake of unconscious libido concentrations. According to Jung, the religious cult feeds on driving forces generated by projective processes, which may thus lead to the completion of the human being (in the religious process)³.

Freud's provocative writings have been a never-ending motivation for members of the psychoanalytical community to make published attempts to reject Freud's understanding of religion. In the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* Blass (2004) summarised the publications of renowned psychoanalysts. She herself believes that

³ According to Henning et al (2003), C. G. Jung's most important writings on religion and psychology are „Psychology and Religion“ (1940, initially known as Terry Lectures 1937), „A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity..“ (1940/41), „Transformation symbolism in the Mass.“ (1941) and „Answer to Job.“

psychoanalysis and religion are simply two different ways towards seeking the same truth; as both approaches fail, there is a chance that a common place for dialogue might be created.

Heated debates on the role of religion also took place outside the realm of depth psychology. The so-called Left Hegelians, whose intellectual leader was Karl Marx, represented an important philosophical movement in the 19th century.

How does Marx' dialectic deduction of religion compare to Freud's?

Marx' understanding of religion surpasses Freud's concept in a crucial aspect. Marx, like Freud, sees religion as a means to express the hardship of the oppressed creature. At the same time, however, he regards religion as a virtual counter-concept to real-life distress. In his *Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy Of Right* (1844, p. 378-379)⁴ he writes:

“Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people.”

(1952). All five writings can be found in Volume XI of the Collected papers of C. G. Jung: “Psychology and Religion: West and East.”

⁴ English: Online Version, Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org) 2000: www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/df-jahrbucher/law-abs.htm

To abolish religion as the illusory happiness of the people is to demand their real happiness. The demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the demand to give up a state of affairs which needs illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears, the halo of which is religion.“

Like Marx, Freud compares the comforts of religion with the effects of a narcotic substance. Yet unlike Marx who considers religion to hold a potential counter-concept to reality, Freud challenges the very notion that man is capable of accomplishing cultural achievements while not being under duress. This viewpoint has been an easy target for critics accusing Freud of wrongly perceiving current cultural development as the essence of culture per se. And indeed, Freud is unable to envision any kind of culture developing without the repression of human drives. By and large, he sees only a limited potential for reducing the destructive, antisocial and anticultural tendencies that are inherent in mankind.

The following criticism, which goes back to Marx and the Freudo-Marxists, is difficult to dismiss: To Freud it is irrelevant that man does not simply come across a given culture, but keeps creating it and is therefore capable of making changes. According to Freud, man is antisocial and anticultural by nature. This viewpoint may be countered on the grounds that culture itself produces antisocial and/or anticultural attitudes. As most members of a given society or civilisation are generally denied adequate participation in decision-making processes that affect them, they are encouraged to seek refuge in a concept like religion that remodels societal reality. For Freud, a voluntary (i.e. self-chosen) renunciation of pleasure in the context of the

reality principle is not a valid alternative. Whether the key is repression or sublimation is yet to be verified.

Freud's theoretical starting point

Initially, Freud built his theory on the concept of the obsessional neurosis. As noted by Brunner, Freud's critical views on religion were both political and politicising as he attributed the function and form of religion "to the dialectics of remembered and imagined power and powerlessness, and submission and authority" (S. 787).

In other words, the description and psychoanalytical analysis of the obsessional neurosis already harbours an essential political element as the unrealistic assessment of power is a key characteristic of this clinical picture.

Having unsettled and provoked the establishment in the late 19th century by providing proof of the existence of the unconscious and describing the concept of infantile sexuality, Freud in 1907 added insult to injury in his essay *Obsessive Actions and Religious Practises* by writing: "*In view of these similarities and analogies one might venture to regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart of the formation of a religion, and to describe that neurosis as an individual religiosity and religion as an universal obsessional neurosis.*" (p. 126).

The main objective of that essay was to prove that symptoms of obsessional neurosis are generally available for analysis in analogy to religious practises. At this

point, Freud was obviously still focussing on the individual and intrapsychic level. This was still evident in his case study of the “Rat Man” which he wrote in 1909. Following these clinical discourses Freud examined the role of religion in its societal manifestation, showing it to be analogous to the clinical picture of the obsessional neurosis.

Reflections on Freud's concept of civilisation

The scope of Freud's work is by no means confined to a mere critique of religion insofar as he ties individuals' attitude towards power and authority to the social environment they are accustomed to. The individual perceives power and authority as natural components of a given societal framework, and internalises them through family-based socialisation resulting in an intrapsychic structure. In 1927 Freud writes in *The Future of an Illusion*:

„For the principal task of civilization, its actual raison d'être, is to defend us against nature.

We all know that in many ways civilization does this fairly well already, and clearly as time goes on it will do it much better. But no one is under the illusion that nature has already been vanquished; and few dare hope that she will ever be entirely subjected to man. There are the elements, which seem to mock at all human control: the earth, which quakes and is torn apart and buries all human life and its works; water, which deluges and drowns everything in a turmoil; storms, which blow everything before them; there are diseases, which we have only recently recognized as attacks by other organisms; and finally there is the painful riddle of death, against which no medicine has yet been found, nor probably will be. With these forces nature rises up against us, majestic, cruel and inexorable; she brings to our mind once more our weakness and helplessness, which we thought to escape through the work of civilization. One of the few

gratifying and exalting impressions which mankind can offer is when, in the face of an elemental catastrophe, it forgets the discordancies of its civilization and all its internal difficulties and animosities, and recalls the great common task of preserving itself against the superior power of nature.” (p. 15-16).

Freud views civilisation and “cultural work” mainly - albeit not exclusively - as man’s response to the forces of nature. As he sees it, the deficits of civilisation are the logical results of man’s inability to find better ways to cope with the elements. In this context, issues of hierarchy and power are in no way prime subjects of his research. In his discourse, the fact that some members of a society harm others (and the way this comes to happen) and some are or become more powerful than others (and the reason why this is the case) appears to be an all but predestined prerequisite for civilisation. In 1933 Freud even writes in “*Why War?*” (p. 212): “*One instance of the innate and ineradicable inequality of men is their tendency to fall into the two classes of leaders and followers. The latter constitute the vast majority; they stand in need of an authority which will make decisions for them and to which they for the most part offer an unqualified submission.*”

Instead of deriving it, Freud takes the patriarchal principle in the primal horde for granted. Consequently, hostility towards civilisation appears to be the inevitable result of the repression of the (biological) drives and of fear coping, and only marginally a consequence of civilisation itself.

Yet Freud gets caught up in contradictions when he elaborates on the wideness of the gap between the privileged and underprivileged classes (The Future of an Illusion, p. 12), which does imply the existence of inequality. If this is the case, man's self-regard - which he mentions in the following quote - should be menaced in different ways.

„The task (of civilization, W. K.) is a manifold one. Man's self-regard, seriously menaced, calls for consolation; life and the universe must be robbed of their terrors; moreover his curiosity, moved, it is true, by the strongest practical interest, demands an answer.

A great deal is already gained with the first step: the humanization of nature. Impersonal forces and destinies cannot be approached; they remain eternally remote. But if the elements have passions that rage as they do in our own souls, if death itself is not something spontaneous but the violent act of an evil Will, if everywhere in nature there are Beings around us of a kind that we know in our own society, then we can breathe freely, can feel at home in the uncanny and can deal by psychical means with our senseless anxiety. (p. 16-17)

Freud obviously believes that the powers that are at work in a society or civilisation have the same qualities - i.e. "impersonal", predestined and alien - as the above-quoted menacing forces. Freud's statements shed a light on the relatively inflexible nature of his views on culture, which he sees as an absolute that is presented to man as a fait accompli. In Freud's terms, culture is thus an unchangeable prerequisite or condition for human acts. But culture must essentially be understood

as something man is able to acquire and required to change. Consequently, culture should be regarded as precondition for and result of human action.

Freud's mind-set is problematic as he tends to ignore the societal implications of the kind of culture he describes. While he does describe the related phenomena he fails to explain why not only the forces of nature are demonised or idealised, but social rule is also perceived as ordained by God and nature (e.g. "emperor by the grace of God"). In his reference to the family-based socialisation of children which is quoted below, Freud fails to mention that infantile socialisation is a product of civilisation and therefore may be changed, unless that civilisation is unchangeable once and for all. But with a view to the potential for change of cultural preconditions Freud remains inconsistent! Here is what Freud says about the way an individual perceives power and powerlessness in our civilisation (1927, p. 17):

For this situation is nothing new. It has an infantile prototype, of which it is in fact only the continuation. For once before one has found oneself in a similar state of helplessness: as a small child, in relation to one's parents. One had reason to fear them, and especially one's father; and yet one was sure of his protection against the dangers one knew. Thus it was natural to assimilate the two situations. Here, too, wishing played its part, as it does in dream-life. The sleeper may be seized with a presentiment of death, which threatens to place him in the grave. But the dream-work knows how to select a condition that will turn even that dreaded event into a wish-fulfilment: the dreamer sees himself in an ancient Etruscan grave which he has climbed down into, happy to find his archaeological interests

satisfied.¹ In the same way, a man makes the forces of nature not simply into persons with whom he can associate as he would with his equals—that would not do justice to the overpowering impression which those forces make on him—but he gives them the character of a father. He turns them into gods, following in this, as I have tried to show,² not only an infantile prototype but a phylogenetic one.“

That Freud uses the biological term "phylogenetic" in this context shows that he regards cultural phenomena primarily as part of nature's sequential evolution while he has little faith in a civilisation's own special dynamics. At this point, it should be noted that a satisfactory definition of Freud's cultural terminology is not available. The above quote closes with another summary of the function of religion (1927, p. 17-18):

“In the course of time the first observations were made of regularity and conformity to law in natural phenomena, and with this the forces of nature lost their human traits. But man's helplessness remains and along with it his longing for his father, and the gods. The gods retain their threefold task: they must exorcize the terrors of nature, they must reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate, particularly as it is shown in death, and they must compensate them for the sufferings and privations which a civilized life in common has imposed on them.“

The arrival of Freudo-Marxism

A group of psychoanalysts – commonly known as “Freudo-Marxists“ - attempted to merge the results of Marxist social analysis with Freud’s insights. Leading figures were Wilhelm Reich, Otto Fenichel and Siegfried Bernfeld. The Freudo-Marxist approach fuelled an intense debate which had its peak before the National Socialists seized power and continues to this day. As opposed to the Freudo-Marxists Grunberger and Chasseguet-Smirgel did not believe that the effects of culture are open to significant changes at the individual level, and specifically dismissed the viewpoint of Reich and his followers by writing:

“By and large, all they want is eliminating the difference between desire and its satisfaction ... This kind of sexual ‘Revolution’ or ‘liberation’ is inherently narcissistic, an illusion” (quotation marks adopted from original).

But for all their differences Marx and Freud do agree on a number of key issues. In 1999 Lichtman writes:

“MARX and FREUD agree on a number of key issues regarding human nature and the appropriate method to research it: (1) Both MARX and FREUD are loyal to the ideals of the Enlightenment and believe in the cognitive power of reason. (2) While embracing rationalism as method of choice, both consider man’s living conditions to be essentially irrational. Both believe that the rational mind does not really govern human behaviour; instead, women and men are driven by forces they can neither control nor comprehend. (3) Therefore, both dismiss the given everyday

interpretations of the world; both are anti-phenomenological and believe that the world's outer appearance differs from the underlying structure to the point that it forms its very opposite. (4) The ultimate reason for this 'false awareness' is our powerlessness, i.e. the fact that we have lost control over key aspects of our existence. (5) For MARX and FREUD power/truth and powerlessness/self-deception are systematically interlinked antipodes. To liberate ourselves from this state of self-alienation we have to reclaim the aspects of our existence which we have lost through oppression and estrangement.” (p. 1009, numerals not in original)

Even though Freud (officially) refused to take part in this heated debate, he was well aware of the controversial nature of his criticism which, it should be noted, is not limited to religion but is directed at civilisation as a whole. In my opinion, in the following quote from *The Future of an Illusion* (1927) Freud's criticism of societal reality is at a peak. As I see it, it is also the point where he concedes, in contrast to the arguments quoted above, that hostility towards civilisation is a response to civilisation itself:

“If we turn to those restrictions that apply only to certain classes of society, we meet with a state of things which is flagrant and which has always been recognized. It is to be expected that these underprivileged classes will envy the favoured ones their privileges and will do all they can to free themselves from their own surplus of privation. Where this is not possible, a permanent measure of discontent will persist within the culture

concerned and this can lead to dangerous revolts. If, however, a culture has not got beyond a point at which the satisfaction of one portion of its participants depends upon the suppression of another, and perhaps larger, portion—and this is the case in all present-day cultures—it is understandable that the suppressed people should develop an intense hostility towards a culture whose existence they make possible by their work, but in whose wealth they have too small a share. In such conditions an internalization of the cultural prohibitions among the suppressed people is not to be expected. On the contrary, they are not prepared to acknowledge the prohibitions, they are intent on destroying the culture itself, and possibly even on doing away with the postulates on which it is based. The hostility of these classes to civilization is so obvious that it has caused the more latent hostility of the social strata that are better provided for to be overlooked. It goes without saying that a civilization which leaves so large a number of its participants unsatisfied and drives them into revolt neither has nor deserves the prospect of a lasting existence“ (p. 12).

As far as religion is concerned, Freud and Marx are agreed that it is a mere illusion (see Wolfenstein 1993). To determine the origin of this phenomenon they follow different, but not necessarily antagonistic approaches: Freud sees religion as an individual attempt to cope with anxiety through projection. Marx describes religion as an upside-down reflection of living conditions, as in a camera obscura. Both attribute to religion a function as a narcotic substance (“opium of the people”). (p. 12)

Limits of Freud's criticism of civilisation

As mentioned before, Freud compared religion as societal phenomenon with the obsessional neurosis as individual phenomenon. On the other hand, Brunner (1996) pointed out that Freud also emphasised the limits of this kind of analogy. In Freud's terms, a neurosis is an "anti-social formation" while the obsessional neurosis as its societal counterpart is a "*cultural creation*" or "*social formation*" (see Freud 1912, p. 36 and 89ff.). Accordingly, a neurotic symptomatology refers to the prohibition or control (or tabooisation) of sexual desires. At the societal level, it refers to the control and containment of striving for power tendencies by means of specific taboos.

Freud's approach is brilliant in that he develops a cultural critique by describing an individual symptomatology as part of an obsessional neurosis. On the other hand, this is also a crucial limiting factor, or even weakness, in his argument: His understanding of culture does not go beyond individual and social aspects and entirely neglects the dimension of the socialised individual.

It was Freud's greatest hope that people could use a growing scientific knowledge base to gain insights that would render religion unnecessary. He hoped that ethical and moral rules would in future not be based on irrational coping with anxiety, but rather be built on scientific insights. In other words, Freud hoped that science would eventually overcome religion. Science as illusion? The great physicist Werner Heisenberg supported Freud by pointing out that the effective range of religions is

limited in time and space. On the other hand, Heisenberg also emphasises the strength and vital relevance of subjective reality concepts that build on religious beliefs. In his writing *Organisation of Reality* ("Ordnung der Wirklichkeit", 1942) he writes:

"The religious order system of the world has therefore often been designated »subjective« as opposed to the »objective« system of science. One has to admit that from a historic perspective a specific religion's claim for truth is limited in time and space, in contrast to that of science. The Greek gods forever ceased to rule the world after no more sacrifices were made in their names. Archimedes' law of the lever, on the other hand, is still valid to this day. But the ancient gods did indeed rule the world as the Greek knew it. Those who say that said rule existed only in people's imagination probably wish to point out that even at that time there may have been unbelievers. However, this would paint an entirely false picture of the events that actually happened to the people of that time. For example, somebody who took part in the festivities held in Dionysos' honour stood a chance to actually encounter that particular god" (p. 51).

Science may indeed serve as a means to overcome religion. On the other hand, as Horkheimer and Adorno pointed out in a 1969 paper, science itself may turn into a myth, or even an illusion. There is some indication that Freud in some way falls for a "science myth" insofar as he sees science as the only driving force towards anticipated change. What exactly have we gained from scientific progress since the Enlightenment?! Is it not true that the enormous benefits of technological

advancement have been achieved by destroying our own resources at a biblical scale?! Can it be that the term “destruction of the environment” is a truth-denying denomination, since it is really about the destruction of the world and ultimately about self-destruction – hence a new illusion?!

In a very detailed essay (1995) Henseler examines religiousness under the aspect of narcissism. He refers to Romain Rolland’s “oceanic feeling” and, unlike Freud, does not identify the longing for a father as the source of religious energy, but a yearning for the first protective figure in the life of a child - that is, a yearning to become one with the mother.

Blanck-Cerijido (1992) also argues along the lines of narcissism theory. She published a very interesting survey of psychoanalytical authors who analysed ethical issues. In her understanding Freud defines in his writing “The Future of an Illusion” religion as an illusion which has its origin in the non-controlled desire to re-establish an infantile, narcissistic situation. She characterises this process as the development of an omnipotence illusion.

Without knowing (or else quoting) his work Blanck-Cerijido thereby disagrees with a relevant contribution by Müller-Braunschweig which dates back to the year 1932. In favour of religion Müller-Braunschweig argues that for man to achieve the required maturity he has to create a distance between himself and the world. To be able to do this - according to Müller-Braunschweig - man has to take a position that is beyond reality. Only then will people be able to achieve a piece of mind and safety of thought that enables them to take on reality.

Müller-Braunschweig's arguments harbour the same problematic rationale as Freud's: Reality is so scary that religion is needed as a narcotic substance. Both Freud and Müller-Braunschweig fail to analyse why this should also apply to societal phenomena, and why society is unable to provide a sufficient level of safety.

The above also transpires in the works of other authors – e.g. Black (1993) - who have addressed this challenging issue. In a generally very subtle paper which also encompasses the Eastern religions, Black ultimately argues along the same lines as Müller-Braunschweig: Individuals need an inner structure of interrelated objects which serves as a sanctuary to protect them from the outside world. According to Black, religion is „... a socially constructed and maintained system of internal objects, analogous to those spoken of in psychoanalysis. Like analytic internal objects, religious objects have a heuristic function but no material existence. Unlike analytic objects, they are derived from a definite cultural tradition and are elaborated over time to meet the experience of practitioners.“

Can we emancipate ourselves from our illusions?

Religions and myths must not be regarded as mere illusions alone; at the times of their validity they may well serve as a source of enlightenment and help to understand and give meaning to the world. In this context Bas Kast (in Berliner Tagesspiegel of August 31st 2008) characterised the pre-Darwinian Christian attempt to explain the world as follows:

“Everything complex which originated from civilisation, from shoe-wear to cathedral, was the work of a creator (shoemaker, architect) who was much more intelligent than his “creature”. The same principle had to apply to nature and, ultimately, to ourselves: Man, too, had obviously been created by something that was a good deal smarter than man himself: God.”

Darwin turned this explanation upside down. He saw that things could work differently, or even the other way round: A stupid process named evolution was capable of producing something like intelligence. Evolution rendered possible what most had considered to be impossible: Design without designer, creatures without creator, intelligence without higher intelligence.“

In conclusion I would like to give reasons why it makes sense to continue to adhere to Freud's interpretation of religion as universal obsessional neurosis: Obsessional neurosis appears to be the appropriate term as the fulfilment of illusionary wishes is the key motivation behind all religious practises. Assuming that religion should not or cannot be eliminated for comprehensible reasons, it is still unclear how the harmful impact of religion-based illusions can be minimised. Do we have a mechanism that is designed to remove the breeding grounds for societal illusions? Maybe not yet - but Brunner (1996) has shown an interesting perspective:

Emancipatory projects must be directed at enabling the powerless to acquire power and overthrowing illusions of having power. Both objectives

are interrelated: Illusions of power, specifically illusions of unrestricted power, impede the acquisition of real power. (p. 814, underlining by W.K.)

Title:

Reflections on S. Freud's "The Future of an Illusion" (1927).

Summary:

In this paper Freud's "The future of an illusion" (1927) is reviewed and analyzed. Freud's point of view is compared with the standpoints of Pfister (1928), Marx (1844) and other authors investigating the relevance of religion within the society. Finally it is taken into consideration how to overcome illusions such as religion.

Zusammenfassung:

In vorliegenden Arbeit wird "Freuds „Die Zukunft einer Illusion“ (1927) besprochen und analysiert. Freuds Standpunkt wird mit den Ansichten von Pfister (1928), Marx (1844) and anderen Autoren verglichen, die die Relevanz von Religion innerhalb der Gesellschaft untersuchen. Abschließend werden Möglichkeiten zur Überwindung von Illusionen wie der Religion angedacht.

References

- Beres, D. (1965). Psychoanalytic Notes on the History of Morality. *J. Am. Psychoanal. Ass.* 13:3-37
- Black, D.M. (1993). What Sort of a Thing is a Religion? A View from Object-Relations Theory. *Int. J. Psychoanal.* 74:613-625
- Blanck-Cereijido, F. (1992). The Creative Role of Interdiction. *Psychoanal. Inquiry* 12:580-593
- Blass, R.B. (2004). Beyond illusion: Psychoanalysis and the question of religious truth. *Int. J. Psychoanal.* 85:615-634
- Brunner, J. (1996). Die Macht der Phantasie – die Phantasie der Macht. Freud und die Politik der Religion. *Psyche – Z. Psychoanal.* 50:786-816
- Feuerbach, L. (1841). *Das Wesen des Christentums*. 4th Edition 1883, Stuttgart (2005): Reclam [Reprint], engl.: *The Essence of Christianity*, translated by George Eliot, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989)
- Freud, E.L., Meng, H. (1963). *Freud S. u. O. Pfister: Briefe 1909-1939*, Frankfurt/M., Fischer.
- Freud, S. (1907). Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices. *Standard Edition IX*, p. 115-127
- Freud, S. (1909). Notes upon a case of Obsessional Neurosis. *Standard Edition X*, p 151-249
- Freud, S. (1912). Totem and Taboo. *Standard Edition XIII*, p. 1-161

- Freud, S. (1921). Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.
Standard Edition XVIII, p. 65-143
- Freud, S. (1927). The Future of an Illusion. Standard Edition XXI, p. 1-56,
- Freud, S. (1930). Civilization and its Discontents. Standard Edition XXI, p. 57-145
- Freud, S. (1932). New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis.
Standard Edition XXII, p. 1-182
- Freud, S. (1933). Why War? Standard Edition XXII, p. 203-215
- Freud, S. (1939). Moses and Monotheism. Standard Edition 23, 1-138
- Grunberger, B., Chasseguet-Smirgel, J. (1979). Freud oder Reich? Frankfurt a. M.:
Ullstein, p. 153.
- Heisenberg, W. (1942). Ordnung der Wirklichkeit. München (1989): Piper,
- Henning, Ch., Murken, S., Nestler, E. (2003). Einführung in die
Religionspsychologie. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Henseler, H. (1995). Religion - Illusion? Eine psychoanalytische Deutung. Göttingen:
Steidl, p. 121-123.
- Horkheimer, M., Adorno, T.W. (1944). Dialektik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt/M. (1969):
Fischer.
- Jung, C. Psychology and Religion (1969). West and East. Collected Works of C. G.
Jung, XI. 2nd ed., Princeton University Press.
- Jung, C. (1971). The problem of types in the history of classical and medieval
thought., Collected Works of C. G. Jung, VI. 2nd ed., Princeton University
Press.

- Lecky, W.E.H. (1869). *History of European Morals*. New York (1955): Braziller.
- Lichtman, R. (1999). Freudomarxismus. In: Haug, W.F. (Ed.) *Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus*, Vol. V, Hamburg: Argument, p. 1008-1026.
- Marx, K. (1844). *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*. Marx-Engels-Werke, Vol. 1, Berlin (1976): Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus, p. 378-391
- Müller-Braunschweig, C. (1932). *The Normal Groundwork of the Religious Attitudes*. *Psychoanal. Review* 19:121-128.
- Nestler, G. (2005). Oskar Pfister. In: Stumm, G., Pritz, A., Voracek, M., Gumhalter, P., Nemskeri, M. (Ed.). *Personenlexikon der Psychotherapie*. Wien: Springer, New York, p. 373-374.
- Pfister, O. (1928). *Die Illusion einer Zukunft: Eine freundschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit Sigmund Freud*. *Imago* 14:149–184; Reprint in: Nase, E., Scharfenberg, J. (Ed.). *Psychoanalyse and Religion*. Darmstadt (1977): Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 101-141
- Wolfenstein, E.V. (1993). *Psychoanalytic-marxism*. New York: Guilford, p. 7 and p. 21.

Address:

Priv. Doz. Dr. med. Werner Köpp, Maassenstr. 8, 10777 Berlin, Germany

e-mail: praxis@dr-werner-koeppe.de

Homepage: www.dr-werner-koeppe.de

Biographical note:

Werner Köpp (*1949), psychoanalyst, training analyst and supervisor in the German Psychoanalytic Society (DPG), associate professor for psychosomatic medicine at the university hospital Charité in Berlin, lecturer at the International Psychoanalytic University in Berlin; research and publications in the field of eating disorders and other psychosomatic diseases.